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The evolution of Norway’s  
national innovation system 
Jan Fagerberg, David C Mowery and Bart Verspagen 
This paper analyses the co-evolution of science, technology and innovation policy and industrial 
structure in a small, open, resource-based economy (Norway). The contributions of the paper are 
threefold. First, it develops an evolutionary and historically oriented approach to the study of the 
development of these policies that may have wide applicability. Second, it focuses on a particular type 
of innovation, innovation in resource-based activities, that differs in many respects from the more 
commonly studied case of innovation in ‘high-tech’ industries. Third, the paper advances our 
understanding of the roles played by institutions and politics in innovation. Previous work on national 
systems of innovation has devoted little attention to these matters, possibly because much of this work 
examines ‘snapshots’ of various innovation systems at a specific point in time and lacks historical 
depth. 
HE ‘NATIONAL INNOVATION SYSTEM’ 
concept first appeared in work by Christopher 
Freeman (1987), Bengt Åke Lundvall (1992) 
and Richard Nelson (1993), and this analytic frame-
work has since been extensively discussed in both 
scholarly and policy-analytic work (Sharif, 2006). 
Yet despite the popularity of the concept, scholars 
disagree on how best to apply the innovation system 
concept to individual nations (Edquist, 2004). This 
paper argues that the development of national inno-
vation systems is best studied as a historical pro-
cess.1 The emergence and evolution of an innovation 
system rests on a co-evolutionary process, in which 
the development of firms and industries, on the one 
hand, interacts with and affects a national public  
research infrastructure, policies and institutions, on 
the other. Such co-evolutionary processes may also 
give rise to path dependencies of various sorts, for 
example, processes that systematically favor some 
types of activities (or solutions or ideas) while con-
straining others (Arthur, 1994; Narula, 2002). Path 
dependencies extend beyond economic structures 
and interactions to include institutions and policies 
(North, 1990; Pierson, 2000). 
The national innovation systems concept has been 
used in both a narrow and a broader sense (Edquist, 
2004). The narrower definition of the national inno-
vation system includes innovative firms and the pub-
lic research infrastructure with which they interact in 
varying degrees (Nelson, 1993). The broader defini-
tion extends to include all learning and innovation 
activities in a country regardless of where these take 
place (Lundvall, 1992, 2003; Edquist, 2004). This 
paper uses a broad definition of the concept.2 Thus 
we consider more than the organizations (e.g. uni-
versities and research institutes) that develop and 
transmit knowledge, or organizational units within 
firms, such as R&D departments, that seek to de-
velop and exploit knowledge. 
This broader perspective is essential for several 
reasons. First, innovation and knowledge yield eco-
nomic benefits less from their creation than from 
their application to the production of new and exist-
ing goods and services. An exclusive focus on the 
creation of new technologies that ignores their ex-
ploitation risks overlooking essential cross-national 
differences in the translation of new knowledge into 
economic gains. The effective exploitation of new 
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knowledge or technology is especially important 
for small countries such as Norway, whose contri-
bution to the global pool of knowledge necessarily 
is dwarfed by the potential contributions from ef-
fective exploitation of this pool for Norway’s eco-
nomic growth. Second, in Norway as well as 
elsewhere, considerable learning and innovation 
occur outside of the boundaries of organizations 
created specifically to support innovation (Lund-
vall, 1992, 2003, 2007). Ignoring the contributions 
to economic prosperity from these ‘non-formal’ in-
novation-related activities may yield a biased ac-
count of the sources of economic growth that in 
turn yields misleading policy guidance. Third, since 
sectors and industries differ in the ways in which 
learning and innovation occur within their bounda-
ries (Pavitt, 1984; Malerba, 2004), the use of a 
broad perspective for understanding innovation is 
especially important in examining a nation such as 
Norway, since its pattern of economic specializa-
tion differs significantly from that of most other 
high-income economies. 
This paper employs historical and evolutionary 
perspectives to analyze the development of the Nor-
wegian innovation system. In the next section we 
outline the paper’s theoretical perspective in  
more detail and relate it to other literature on the 
subject. The third section presents an analysis of the 
contemporary Norwegian innovation system and 
compares it with other countries on a similar level of 
economic development. This analysis highlights 
some important differences between the Norwegian 
innovation system and those of its Nordic neighbors, 
Finland and Sweden. One unusual feature of the 
Norwegian innovation system that has been charac-
terized as ‘paradoxical’ (OECD, 2007; Grønning et 
al, 2008) is the fact that Norway combines high 
growth in productivity and income with compara-
tively low levels of investment in R&D. Although 
paradoxical by comparison with other industrial 
economies, these features of Norway’s economy and 
innovation system reflect the historical development 
of the Norwegian economy, as we point out in the 
fourth section. The final section summarizes the  
lessons of our study. 
Innovation, path dependency and policy: 
theoretical perspectives 
Evolutionary approaches to the analysis of innova-
tion emphasize variety creation, adaptation, selection 
and retention, all of which are time- and path-
dependent. At any point in time many new ideas 
emerge, but only those that are well adapted to the 
contemporary selection environment are likely to be 
applied and form the basis for continuing adaptation 
and improvement. This selection process is associ-
ated with a Schumpeterian process of technological 
competition (Fagerberg, 2003), characterized by en-
try (and exit) of firms, continuous innovation, grad-
ual development of standards, the adaptation or 
creation of institutions, etc.  
Nevertheless, there are important differences 
among industries or technological fields in the op-
eration of these processes (Pavitt, 1984; Carlsson 
and Stankiewicz, 1991; Malerba, 2004). For exam-
ple, in pharmaceuticals or biotechnology, codified 
knowledge, university research and formal instru-
ments for protection of intellectual property (e.g. 
patents) are very important, while in some other 
fields, such as the auto industry, ship-building and 
construction, these factors are less important than in-
house learning, interaction with customers and sup-
pliers, or secrecy (Malerba, 2004; Von Tunzelmann 
and Acha, 2004). 
A national system of innovation consists of firms 
in many different sectors operating within a common 
(national) ‘knowledge infrastructure’ and a common 
institutional and political framework. The sectoral 
composition of a given national economy therefore 
influences the operation and structure of its national 
innovation system, even as the national innovation 
system affects the performance of its constituent sec-
toral systems. Hence, the relationship between sec-
toral and national innovation systems is a co-
evolutionary one, in which sectoral characteristics 
(and the needs of firms in these sectors) influence 
the development of the knowledge infrastructure,  
institutions and policies at the national level,  
while these factors influence the subsequent evolu-
tion of the national economy, including its sectoral 
composition. 
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The importance and extent of path dependency 
within innovation processes have given rise to a 
large literature (Arthur, 1989, 1994; David, 1986; 
North, 1990; Grabher, 1993; Liebowitz and Mar-
golis, 1994, 1995; Pierson, 2000; Niosi, 2002; Mar-
tin and Sunley, 2006). Within economics, much of 
this literature has focused on mechanisms that may 
lead to economies of scale, such as the adoption of 
standards. However, institutions and politics may 
also be relevant in this context (Pierson, 2000; 
Whitley, 2002). Institutions or ‘rules of the game’ 
(North, 1990) are difficult and costly to establish but 
facilitate economic interactions enormously once 
adopted, leading to scale advantages. Thus, institu-
tions and, arguably, politics (Rose, 1990) may be 
important sources of path dependency in their own 
right (North, 1990). 
The national innovation system is also the selec-
tion environment for new entrepreneurial ventures, 
and path dependency influences these selection 
processes. New ventures that have little in common 
with economically strong existing sectors may find 
that the national innovation system is poorly adapted 
to their needs. Narula (2002), for example, argued 
that the development of Norway’s innovation system 
has produced a structure of policies and institutions 
that provide little support for new, knowledge-
intensive sectors. 
Although path dependency has been important in 
the evolution of the Norwegian and other national 
innovation systems, the development of these sys-
tems is affected by more than past developments 
alone. Innovation systems are open systems; new 
initiatives do appear within them, and the selection 
processes that winnow out these initiatives are 
complex and operate at multiple levels.3 It is unre-
alistic to portray the knowledge infrastructure, en-
trepreneurs, and political coalitions within even a 
relatively small nation such as Norway as mono-
lithic. For example, as we will show below, Nor-
wegian entrepreneurs with contrasting interests and 
economic visions exploited different political 
groups with conflicting perceptions of the eco-
nomic future to gain political and financial support 
for new undertakings. 
The Norwegian innovation system in  
comparative perspective 
Norway was once one of the poorer countries in 
Europe. According to Maddison (2003), in 1870 
Norway’s gross domestic product (GDP) per capita 
was only three-quarters of the Western European av-
erage. By 1973, however, Norway had caught up 
with most Western European countries and, by 2001, 
Norway’s GDP per capita was one quarter higher 
than the Western European average. Hence by the 
beginning of the 21st century, Norway had become 
one of the richest countries in the world. 
How can such a remarkable episode of economic 
growth be explained? The explanation of interna-
tional differences in economic performance has been 
a central theme for economists since Adam Smith 
first raised the question in his study of The Wealth of 
Nations (1776). Until recently, however, most 
economists’ thinking about the subject focused on 
such factors as natural-resource endowments, labor 
supply and capital accumulation. More recent re-
search, however, has shifted its focus towards intan-
gibles such as knowledge or innovation.4 
Innovation is often associated with high-
technology industries, such as information and 
communication technologies, scientific research in 
large-scale facilities in firms or universities, and 
professionals working in urban environments. Nor-
way, however, has no major international firms in 
high-tech industries, and no university that ranks 
among the top 50 worldwide. Moreover, Norway’s 
population is small (currently 4.6 million) and the 
country is among the 50 countries with the lowest 
population density in the world (about 12 people 
per km2). Its capital and largest city, Oslo, has just 
over half a million inhabitants. These characteris-
tics are rarely associated with strong national inno-
vative performance, especially in knowledge-
intensive industries. 
Figure 1 compares Norwegian GDP per capita 
(measured in purchasing power parity terms) with 
regional GDP per capita in Western Europe.5 The 
thin black line shows the Norwegian level, and the 
thick black line indicates the Western European av-
erage. As we noted earlier, postwar Norwegian GDP 
per capita was roughly equal to the Western Euro-
pean average until the first oil crisis of the 1970s, 
which led to recession and lower growth elsewhere 
in Europe. Norway was less seriously affected by the 
recession, and experienced more rapid growth than 
the other countries in Western Europe after the mid-
1970s. This Norwegian ‘growth spurt’ is related to 
the discovery of Norway’s offshore oil and gas 
fields that began production in the early 1970s (the 
two dotted lines in Figure 1 depict Norwegian oil 
and gas production). Although oil and gas produc-
tion remained low in the first half of the 1970s, out-
put subsequently grew rapidly, and this sector’s 
importance within the Norwegian economy in-
creased dramatically from 1975 onwards. 
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Norway was not the only northwest European  
nation to discover and exploit offshore oil and gas 
deposits during the 1960s and 1970s — the United 
Kingdom, Denmark, and the Netherlands all bene-
fited from similar discoveries. Nonetheless, the 
transformative effects of oil and gas appear to have 
been most significant in the Norwegian economy. 
Although Norway’s oil and gas sector accounts for a 
small share of national employment, the sector’s de-
velopment opened up a huge market that Norwegian 
manufacturing and services firms successfully ex-
ploited, partly as a result of public policy. Firms in 
sectors such as shipbuilding, engineering, ICT and 
other business services expanded their sales in this 
rapidly expanding market, aided by supportive gov-
ernmental policies (see Engen, 2009). In the Nether-
lands, another small open economy, oil and gas 
production was associated with de-industrialization, 
the so-called ‘Dutch disease’, resulting from the ap-
preciation of its currency a loss in competitiveness 
within domestic manufacturing. In Norway, how-
ever, the growth of the oil and gas sector benefited 
domestic manufacturing industry, output from which 
arguably grew more rapidly than otherwise might 
have been the case (Cappelen et al, 2000). 
The rapidly increasing income from the oil and 
gas sector also enabled Norway’s government to 
pursue a more expansionary fiscal and monetary pol-
icy than those of other Western European govern-
ments during the 1980s and 1990s. Consequently, 
Norwegian rates of labor force participation and 
economic growth were consistently higher — and 
unemployment markedly lower — than in Western 
Europe as a whole. Norwegian GDP per capita now 
is approximately one quarter higher than the West-
ern European average (Figure 1). About one half of 
this difference can be explained as rents from oil and 
gas production (reflecting returns to investment in 
physical capital above what is ‘normal’ in the econ-
omy as a whole).6 It should be emphasized, how-
ever, that by allowing high growth in demand, high 
labor force participation and rapid (and economi-
cally beneficial) structural changes, the oil and gas 
sector also had important indirect effects on the 
economy. What Norwegian GDP per capita would 
have been in the absence of oil and gas exploration 
is a difficult question that we cannot pursue in the 
necessary detail here.7 But it seems likely that Nor-
way’s economic development without oil and gas 
would not differ dramatically from that of its 
neighbors, Denmark and Sweden. 
Although oil and gas now is Norway’s most eco-
nomically important resource-related industry, Nor-
wegian economic development historically has relied 
on the exploitation of a rich natural resource en-
dowment. Most of these resources were related to 
the geography of the country, such the sea (fishing, 
shipping and related industries), and other opportu-
nities created by Norway’s mountainous terrain for 
mining and production of hydroelectric power, 
which provided the basis for the nation’s electro-
metallurgical and -chemical industries. Although 
these sectors now account for a smaller share of 
Norwegian GDP than in previous periods, they are 
important sources of income and employment in 
some regions of Norway and retain considerable in-
fluence in Norwegian domestic politics. They also 
contribute significantly to Norway’s exports. 
Figure 1.  Norwegian economic growth and the rise of the oil and gas sector,  
1950–2007 
Source:  GGDC Total Economy Data Base www.ggdc.net for GDP pc data,  
Statistics Norway for oil and gas data 
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Figure 2 illustrates the Norwegian pattern of spe-
cialization in production of tradable goods and ser-
vices in 2002, relative to the European average. The 
index has a zero mean and varies between unity (in-
dicating products that are produced only in Norway) 
and minus one (not produced in Norway).8 It shows 
that in addition to its large oil and gas sector, Nor-
way remains highly specialized in fisheries, shipping 
and related industries. During the second half of the 
20th century, Norway pioneered the development of 
fish-farming, and the nation remains among the 
global leaders in this industry. As we noted earlier, 
the shipbuilding industry has retained its economic 
significance within Norway by diversifying into 
production of equipment for exploration and produc-
tion of oil and gas. The basic metals sector, a large 
user of hydroelectric power, is another natural re-
source-based sector in which Norway remains spe-
cialized. 
The relationship between Norway’s pattern of 
economic specialization and its innovation system is 
a central theme of this paper and the topic of long-
running policy debates in Norway. As was noted 
above, one view of the role of technology in eco-
nomic growth holds that a strong high-technology 
industrial base (consisting of ICT, biotech, new ma-
terials, pharmaceuticals, and selected other indus-
tries) is necessary for prosperity. As we argue in the 
following section, however, Norway’s resource-
based sectors (aluminium, oil and gas, and fish-
farming) have for decades been highly innovative, 
drawing on domestic sources of innovation, technol-
ogy transfer from foreign sources (the success of 
which relied on substantial indigenous Norwegian 
‘absorptive capacity’) and Norway’s universities and 
research institutes. 
One manifestation of the strong performance of 
Norway’s economy during the past 30 years is its 
high rate of labor productivity growth, which has 
averaged more than 2.5% per year since 1975 
(OECD, 2007). This strong economic performance, 
however, is associated with much lower levels of 
R&D investment than in most other high-income 
European economies.9 Figure 3 compares R&D 
spending as a share of GDP in Norway with that of 
other high-income industrial economies, and shows 
that Norway’s R&D/GDP ratio of 1.6% is in the 
lower half of the reference group. Moreover, like 
most other countries with low R&D intensity, Nor-
way’s economy is characterized by a relatively large 
share of government-financed R&D, which consists 
mainly of R&D carried out in universities and insti-
tutes within the public sector. 
Although R&D spending is widely used in cross-
national comparisons, it is only one of several im-
portant factors contributing to strong national inno-
vative performance. In fact, the importance of R&D 
investment relative to other factors varies substan-
tially among economic sectors (Fagerberg et al, 
2004). Does the unusual Norwegian pattern of spe-
cialization by comparison with other European 
economies explain its lower levels of R&D invest-
ment? For instance, it is possible that the sectoral in-
novation systems in Norway’s fields of 
specialization operate differently, or rely on sources 
of innovation that require lower levels of R&D in-
vestment, than in other European economies. We 
examine this question by controlling for cross-
national differences in economic specialization pat-
terns when comparing R&D investment levels 
across countries. 
For example, the ICT industry is very R&D-
intensive, and accounts for a large share of Swedish 
GDP. Norway’s ICT industry, however, is small. 
This structural difference between the two econo-
mies contributes to the higher GDP share of R&D 
Figure 2.  The five leading areas of Norwegian specialization, based on production of tradable goods and
services in 2002 
Source:  GGDC 60 Industries Data Base <www.ggdc.net>
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performed in industry in Sweden relative to Norway. 
By using a common set of sectoral weights when 
comparing Norway and Sweden, we are able to con-
trol for the effects of such structural differences.10 
Figure 4 compares the share of value added ac-
counted for by Norwegian business R&D (R&D per-
formed within industry) with similar figures for 
other Western European countries as reported by the 
OECD (‘actual’) and weighted by the industrial 
structure of the country with which Norway is  
compared (‘adjusted’). If Norwegian firms on aver-
age do more R&D than firms in the same sectors in 
the other country, the ‘adjusted’ ratio will be above 
one and vice versa. 
The results reported in Figure 4 indicate that  
Norway’s economic structure affects its low R&D/ 
GDP ratio. In five out of the six comparisons (the 
exception being Sweden, a nation with one of the 
highest R&D/GDP ratios in the world), Norwegian 
firms perform as much business-enterprise R&D as 
Figure 4. Norway’s share of business R&D in GDP relative to those of other countries, actual and
adjusted for structural differences, 2001/2002 
Source:  Authors’ calculations based on OECD and Eurostat data
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Figure 3.  R&D as a percentage of GDP: Norway and a reference group of European economies, 2004 
Source:  OECD 
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do foreign firms in the same sectors. The finding 
that the low level of Norwegian R&D is influenced 
by the nation’s pattern of economic specialization is 
corroborated by the results of other studies (OECD, 
2007). Nonetheless, as we pointed out earlier, R&D 
is only one factor in innovation, and R&D invest-
ment data may not capture other important aspects 
of sectoral or national innovation-related activity. 
One source of data that covers a broader set of inno-
vation-related activities is the Community Innova-
tion Survey (CIS), carried out throughout Europe. 
Innovation in this survey is a broad concept that in-
cludes the introduction of production and processes 
that are new to the firm, not necessarily new to the 
market (Bloch, 2007). 
Figure 5 compares the share of innovative firms in 
Norway with that of other European countries (as 
reported by the CIS4, the fourth version of the sur-
vey, undertaken in 2004). The measure ‘share of in-
novative firms’ is the number of firms that report 
having undertaken successful product or process in-
novation divided by the total number of reporting 
firms for the country in question. As in Figure 4, the 
Norwegian share is compared with those for other 
economies on an ‘actual’ and ‘adjusted’ basis, the 
latter comparison being adjusted for cross-national 
differences in industrial structure. Thus, if Norwe-
gian firms are more innovative than firms in the 
other country, the ‘adjusted’ share will be above one 
or vice versa. The data in Figure 5 suggest that the 
share of innovative firms in Norway is comparable 
to that of several Southern European countries but 
lower than that of other high-income countries in 
Northern Europe with which it may more usefully be 
compared (particularly Sweden and Germany). In-
terestingly, and in contrast to R&D (Figure 4), the 
result does not appear to be sensitive to cross-
national differences in specialization patterns.11 
The Community Innovation Survey also contains 
important information about qualitative features of 
the Norwegian innovation system. As emphasized in 
the innovation literature (Lundvall, 1992; Van de 
Ven, 1999) innovation is an interactive phenome-
non, and success depends on the ability of firms to 
cooperate with others and with customers (Lundvall, 
1988; Von Hippel, 1988). The central importance of 
the latter follows from the simple insight that inno-
vations that do not address customer needs often fail. 
Moreover, there is a good deal of customer-based 
learning that may benefit innovating firms. Figure 6 
reports the share of firms that cooperate with others 
in innovation (based on data from the CIS). Norway, 
together with the other Nordic countries, scores es-
pecially high on this dimension. Norway also ranks 
high on the reported importance of producer–
customer interactions in innovation (Figure 7). 
Innovation is not only — or mainly — about in-
venting new things, but depends as well on commer-
cial exploitation of the opportunities created by new 
knowledge in established as well as new industries 
and products (Schumpeter, 1934; Kline and 
Rosenberg, 1986; Fagerberg, 2004). One measure of 
a country’s ability to identify, absorb and exploit 
new knowledge, often termed ‘absorptive capacity’ 
(Cohen and Levinthal, 1990), is the level of educa-
tion among its population, particularly levels of 
higher education (Figure 8). Norway and other Nor-
dic countries have substantially higher shares of ter-
tiary-education degreeholders than is true of many 
other European economies. Another indicator of ab-
sorptive capacity is the level of adoption of impor-
tant new technologies within an economy. Figure 9 
compares the level of Norwegian adoption in 2005 
of one such ‘general purpose technology’, personal 
computers, with that of other European nations, re-
vealing that the Nordic countries, including Norway, 
display the highest rates of adoption for PCs. These 
indicators point to an important strength of the  
Figure 5.  Innovative firms as a share of all Norwegian firms relative to other European economies,
actual and adjusted for structural differences, 2004 
Source:  Eurostat (CIS 4) 
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Norwegian innovation system: its strong perform-
ance in knowledge diffusion and cooperation in in-
novation.12 This characteristic of national innovation 
systems is typically not captured by conventional in-
dicators of innovation inputs or outputs. 
The Norwegian economy has generated strong 
growth in productivity, employment and income 
since 1970. At the same time, however, Norway in-
vests an unusually low share of GDP in R&D, par-
ticularly within the business sector, and the CIS data 
also suggest that the level of industrial innovation in 
Norway is not particularly impressive, at least by 
comparison with other high-income economies in 
Northern Europe. Other characteristics of industrial 
innovation in Norway, however, such as the level of 
collaboration in innovation, producer–customer  
interaction, the qualifications of the labor force and 
the limited indicators on technology adoption, are 
relatively strong by comparison with most other 
European economies. These apparently contradic-
tory indicators and findings underscore the need for 
a more detailed examination of the evolution of Nor-
way’s national innovation system. 
The development of the Norwegian  
innovation system: historical co-evolution 
of sectors, institutions and policies 
Norway’s economic development has been charac-
terized by the emergence over time of sectors with 
different approaches to innovation (Wicken, 
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Figure 6. Share of innovative firms with cooperation arrangements on innovation activities,
Norway and a reference group, 2001/2002 
Source:  CIS 3 (Eurostat) 
Figure 7.  Share of innovative firms that rank customers as ‘highly important’ 
sources of information for innovation, Norway and a reference group, 
2001/2002 
Source:  CIS 3 (Eurostat) 
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2009a,b). The ‘small-scale decentralized’ develop-
ment path, which dominated Norway until the early 
20th century and remains economically and politi-
cally important, is characterized by small firms that 
invest little of their own funds in innovation-related 
activities. Beginning in the late 19th century, how-
ever, a sector characterized by large-scale, central-
ized enterprises, often financed by foreigners, 
expanded within Norway, based on the exploitation 
of opportunities in capital- and energy-intensive in-
dustries such as in metals, electrochemistry, and hy-
droelectric power. But as we note below, even the 
firms within these industries were slow to develop 
in-house R&D. 
After the Second World War, an influential group 
of policy-makers, technocrats and academics — the 
‘modernizers’ (see Box 1) — promoted the growth 
of a ‘knowledge-intensive, network-based’ devel-
opment path characterized by R&D-intensive firms 
in ‘new’ industrial sectors such as ICT, relying on 
public investments in Norway’s national R&D infra-
structure of public laboratories and universities. In 
Norway, as in other high-income economies, these 
three development paths and corresponding sectoral 
innovation systems have coexisted, rather than one 
being succeeded historically by another. Norway 
thus is home to a diverse and complex ‘ecology’ of 
innovation systems, illustrated by the contrasting  
Figure 8. Percentage of population with tertiary education (age 25–64), Norway and a reference group,  
2000–2004  
Source:  OECD (2006), Education at a Glance 
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Figure 9.  Penetration of PCs within the population, Norway and a reference group, 2005 
Source:  World Bank (World Development Indicators 2007) 
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examples of fish-farming, aluminium, and informa-
tion technology, all three of which have played im-
portant roles in Norway through much of the 20th 
century. 
At the beginning of the 20th century, the Norwe-
gian economy relied extensively on external sources 
for new technologies. Technologies from foreign 
sources were adapted to Norwegian conditions by 
technically trained individuals, many of whom had 
been educated abroad. A national public research in-
frastructure evolved slowly in response to the needs 
of Norwegian firms and industries (Gulbrandsen and 
Nerdrum, 2009a), and initially gave priority to sup-
porting established (and politically influential) in-
dustries, such as mining, fisheries and agriculture. A 
mining college was founded under Danish rule  
during the 18th century, and by the turn of the 20th 
century, Norway’s primary industries lobbied suc-
cessfully for the formation of public research insti-
tutes in agriculture and fisheries. Only with the 
emergence of the large-scale, capital-intensive in-
dustries of the early 20th century was Norway’s 
technical university (NTNU) established (1910), 
nearly a century after the foundation of Sweden’s 
technical university. Once established, NTNU be-
came an important source of qualified personnel for 
industry, particularly Norway’s scale-intensive, re-
source-based enterprises. Norwegian university sci-
entists and engineers became active in industrial 
consultancy in the first half of the 20th century, and 
during the following decades Norway’s research in-
stitutes, many of which are public (or semi-public), 
expanded their operations. Foreign sources of tech-
nology and capital also continued to play an impor-
tant role in many of Norway’s large-scale, resource-
intensive industries 
By the mid-20th century, Norway’s national in-
novation system had acquired many of its current 
features. Norwegian firms were innovative in many 
respects and demanded highly educated labor. But 
they invested little in internal R&D. Instead they 
utilized ‘localized search’ (Nelson and Winter, 
1982) in problem-solving, seeking technical knowl-
edge from other firms, research institutes, public 
sources, academia, etc. Only when the search for so-
lutions from external sources was unsuccessful did 
Norwegian firms invest substantially in intrafirm 
R&D. In-house R&D became more significant as 
some Norwegian firms approached the international 
knowledge frontier during the 1960s and 1970s. 
Nevertheless, through much of the 20th century, the 
dominant approach to innovation within much of 
Norwegian industry relied on interaction with other 
actors in the system, in combination with modest 
levels of investment in intrafirm R&D (Wicken, 
2009a,b; Gulbrandsen and Nerdrum, 2009a). 
Even today the strong tendency for Norwegian 
firms to engage with other partners in innovation, for 
example, to pursue collaborative innovation strate-
gies, distinguishes Norway’s innovation system from 
that of many other developed economies, as we noted 
earlier. In particular, as Lepori et al (2007) point out, 
the propensity of Norwegian firms to cooperate with 
public research institutes is high by international 
standards; 30–40% of the firms in several important 
Norwegian manufacturing industries report that they 
collaborate with public research institutes (Gulbrand-
sen and Nerdrum, 2009b), and user surveys indicate 
that the firms value such cooperation highly. These 
surveys also reveal that prior experience with such 
cooperation heavily affects both Norwegian firms’ 
willingness to cooperate with public institutions and 
the value that they assign to such collaboration, illus-
trating the path-dependent character of these relation-
ships (Nerdrum and Gulbrandsen, 2009). 
The historically low level of investment by Nor-
wegian firms in intrafirm R&D did not preclude 
technological innovation. The extensive structural 
changes that have occurred in the Norwegian econ-
omy during the last century have been accompanied 
by a stream of economically important innovations. 
Box 1. The ‘modernizers’ 
Norway’s dependence on natural resources has always 
been controversial within domestic politics. During the post-
1945 period, a strong and politically powerful lobby of ‘mod-
ernizers’ gained political power and argued that a moderni-
zation of the industrial structure of the country in the 
direction of ‘high-tech’ industry, particularly ICT, was a must. 
The ‘modernizers’ were strongly influenced by the achieve-
ments of US and British scientists, military research facilities 
and ‘high-tech’ firms during and after the Second World War 
and wanted to create a similar dynamic in Norway by sup-
porting military R&D, public research labs (particularly within 
ICT) and selected ‘high-tech’ firms. The national industrial 
research council (NTNF) and national defense research es-
tablishment (FFI), both established in 1946, were central in-
stitutional actors in the ‘modernizing’ network, along with 
other public and semi-public laboratories (Wicken, 2009b; 
Gulbrandsen and Nerdrum, 2009a). 
The modernizers’ economic and political agenda was 
widely accepted among policy-makers, and for several 
decades public R&D labs and selected high-tech firms, par-
ticularly within ICT, received substantial financial and politi-
cal support from government (Wicken, 2009b). These 
policies produced several important inventions in military 
technology, computer software (e.g. the SIMULA language; 
see Sogner, 2009), computer hardware and telecommunica-
tions, including the GSM system for mobile telephony 
(Sogner, 2009). For a time, these investments generated 
substantial civilian spinoffs in the form of thriving ‘high- 
tech’ firms in the computer and telecommunication indus-
tries. However, the displacement within the global IT indus-
try of dominant technologies such as minicomputers, the 
shift towards a more economically liberal political stance 
among Norwegian policy-makers, deregulation efforts 
and the intensified global competition in ICT that character-
ized the 1980s all undermined Norway’s ‘high-tech’ indus-
trial strategy. Many of the firms supported by these 
programs went out of business and today production of ICT 
products for the mass market has ceased in Norway 
(Sogner, 2009). 
The attempt to make Norway a ‘high-tech’ leader thus 
ended in failure. The competences created by these policies 
in ICT technology, however, produced payoffs in other parts 
of the economy, particularly in the rapidly expanding oil and 
gas industry (Engen, 2009; Sogner, 2009). Hence, instead 
of substituting for resource-based industries, as the ‘mod-
ernizers’ envisaged, their efforts instead strengthened inno-
vation and competitiveness within the resource-based 
sector. 
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For example, the rise of the large-scale, capital-
intensive path of economic development in the early 
20th century was based on the exploration of hy-
droelectric energy by Norwegian entrepreneurs such 
as Sam Eyde who, in a classically Schumpeterian 
fashion, developed a ‘new combination’ of knowl-
edge, capabilities and resources (Wicken, 2009a; 
Gulbrandsen and Nerdrum, 2009a). The Norwegian 
oil and gas industry faced daunting challenges in 
producing oil and gas under conditions of unprece-
dented complexity and hazardousness, and devel-
oped new technological and organizational solutions 
(e.g. the CONDEEP platforms; see Engen, 2009). 
The Norwegian fish-farming industry also relied on 
a stream of important innovations in fish farming, 
processing, and disease control. 
But none of these major innovations, which relied 
on well-developed engineering competences and 
highly competent labor, depended on large-scale in-
trafirm R&D programs. Indeed, many such innova-
tions, which affected the entire production system of 
Norway’s natural-resource industries, may not even 
be classified as innovations by CIS-type surveys that 
mainly focus on technological (product and process) 
innovations (Smith, 2004). 
The previous section emphasized the contribu-
tions of institutions and politics to the path-
dependent development of innovation systems, and 
the evolution of the Norwegian national innovation 
system clearly reflects the influence of political as 
well as institutional developments. For example, the 
continued existence and extensive government sup-
port for the ‘small-scale, decentralized’ path of in-
dustrial development in Norway was the outcome of 
intense political struggles during the interwar period 
(Wicken, 2009a). The resulting political commit-
ments and institutions shaped the organization of the 
Norwegian fish-farming industry half a century later 
and continues to influence the development of that 
industry in modern Norway. 
These policies, along with other characteristics of 
Norwegian fish-farming, have produced a structure 
that contrasts with some of those other countries, 
particularly Scotland, that entered the industry later. 
While in Scotland fish-farming is dominated by 
large firms, the Norwegian industry has a much 
more heterogeneous structure, in which a small 
number of large, increasingly global firms coexist 
with a large group of small, family-owned firms 
(Aslesen, 2009). 
Another example of institutional persistence that 
had far-reaching consequences for Norwegian eco-
nomic and technological development is the ‘con-
cession laws’ that were adopted in the early 
decades of the 20th century. These laws were 
originally drafted to create a framework for na-
tional control of natural resources, specifically, hy-
droelectric power, and influenced the early years of 
Norway’s aluminium industry (Moen, 2009). But as 
Engen (2009) notes, this regulatory heritage also 
influenced the development of Norway’s offshore 
oil and gas sector more than half a century later. 
The technological and organizational development 
of the Norwegian oil and gas industry might well 
have followed a very different path that more 
closely resembled that in the offshore oil and gas 
industries in Denmark and the United Kingdom in 
the absence of the regulatory system created during 
the early 20th century for an entirely different  
sector. 
Institutions and politics thus have exerted great 
influence on the development of Norway’s national 
innovation system, and the Norwegian case is by no 
means unique. Previous work on national systems of 
innovation has devoted little attention to the historic 
co-evolution of industries, institutions, and politics, 
possibly because much of it examines ‘snapshots’ of 
various innovation systems at a specific point in 
time. One of the advantages of this historical, evolu-
tionary perspective is that it advances our under-
standing of the roles played by institutions and 
politics in innovation. 
Concluding remarks: the Norwegian  
‘paradox’ revisited 
Norway’s economic performance has been charac-
terized as a ‘paradox’ (OECD, 2007; Grønning et 
al, 2008). Productivity and income are among  
the highest in the world, even when the rents from 
the oil and gas sector are excluded from the calcu-
lations. But Norwegian R&D investment accounts 
for a small share of GDP by comparison with other 
industrial economies, and other measures of  
Norwegian innovation activity, although imprecise, 
also are not very impressive. How can this be  
explained? 
Three interrelated aspects of Norwegian economic 
development are important in explaining this para-
dox. They are subsumed under the headings: innova-
tion, path dependency, and policy. 
Innovation 
The broad perspective on innovation and long-run 
economic change employed in this paper highlights 
the important role that innovation has played in 
Norway’s economic performance, although the 
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characteristics of Norway’s industrial base and the 
processes of innovation that it supports mean that 
much of this innovation has eluded straightforward 
measurement. Perhaps the most important factor in 
Norway’s innovative performance has been the abil-
ity of Norwegian entrepreneurs, firms, and public 
sector actors to recognize opportunities, mobilize re-
sources, adapt existing capabilities and develop new 
ones, and develop appropriate institutions and poli-
cies. The system’s adaptability thus appears to be 
one of the important factors contributing to Nor-
way’s successful technological and economic devel-
opment. This adaptability arguably reflects other 
social, cultural, institutional and/or political charac-
teristics of Norway and other nations that we cannot 
pursue here but present promising lines for future re-
search.13 
Path dependency 
Second, the historical development of Norway’s na-
tional innovation system is characterized by strong 
path dependency. The Norwegian innovation system 
has been dominated by resource-based innovation. 
The development of new industries that are less 
closely linked to natural resources, in spite of con-
siderable support from public policy, has been rela-
tively unsuccessful in Norway. The failure of the 
‘modernizing’ policies in Norway is less a result of 
active resistance from established firms in politically 
powerful sectors than a reflection of the continued 
vitality of innovation-led growth and productivity in 
those sectors (Castellacci et al, 2009). Norway’s re-
source-based sectors have displayed considerable 
dynamism in developing knowledge and adapting to 
new challenges. 
Policy 
Third, as we pointed out above, institutions and poli-
tics have fundamentally influenced the development 
of Norway’s industrial structure and its innovation-
related activities. Arguably, path dependency is as 
much a political and institutional phenomenon as an 
economic one in Norway’s national innovation sys-
tem. The political and institutional factors that have 
been important in the Norwegian case nevertheless 
extend far beyond a narrow definition of science, 
technology and innovation policy, underscoring the 
need to employ a broad perspective in the study of 
innovation systems. 
However successful Norway’s economy appears to 
be today, its history of innovation and economic 
growth does not constitute a basis for complacency 
about the future, which poses significant challenges. 
Although the oil and gas sector will remain eco-
nomically important, there can be no doubt that the 
period of rapid economic growth based on the ex-
ploitation of Norway’s offshore oil and gas is ap-
proaching its end, and future growth will have to 
rely on other sources (OECD, 2008). A second im-
portant change is the end of the century-long era of 
cheap hydroelectric energy, the abundant supply of 
which led to the establishment of electrometallurgi-
cal and electrochemical industries in Norway. The 
future competitiveness of these Norwegian indus-
tries will depend on technological and organizational 
innovations that offset the advantages flowing to 
foreign firms with lower energy costs. 
Thus, although natural resources may play an im-
portant role in Norway’s future economic growth, 
maintaining the nation’s strong performance will re-
quire an increase in the level and scope of innovative 
activity. Arguably, this need for expanded innova-
tion holds not only for the areas of traditional 
strength but for the economy as a whole.14 Hence, 
raising the share of Norway’s overall firm popula-
tion that is active in innovation, rather than focusing 
primarily on firms in ‘high tech’ sectors, is a natural 
target for innovation policy.15 
Notes 
1. This paper draws on a research project, ‘Innovation, Path 
Dependency and Policy’, financed by the Norwegian Re-
search Council (KUNI program, project # 154877) and a book 
based on the research in the project (Fagerberg, J, D C 
Mowery and B Verspagen, eds. 2009). The economic support 
from the Research Council is gratefully acknowledged. 
Mowery acknowledges additional support from the National 
Science Foundation (Cooperative Agreement #0531184). The 
authors would also like to express their gratitude to the Cen-
tre for Advanced Study at the Norwegian Academy of Sci-
ence and Letters in Oslo, which sponsored the 
‘Understanding Innovation Group’ that included the authors, 
during the academic year 2007–2008 when this paper was 
written. An earlier draft of this paper was presented at the 
joint GLOBELICS –PRIME session, ‘The Role of STI Policies 
for development’, 24 September 2008, Mexico City, Mexico. 
2. For a critique of a broad definition of innovation and the inno-
vation system concept see Viotti (2002). 
3. Norwegian economic history contains a number of examples 
of successful new initiatives that relied for their creation on 
foreign entrepreneurs, capital or markets. The establishment 
of Norsk Hydro, for example, although spearheaded by Nor-
wegians, succeeded only because of support from foreign in-
vestors, and foreign investment and technology have played 
important roles in other important new industries in Norwe-
gian history (Lie, 2005). 
4. These include evolutionary economics (Nelson and Winter, 
1982), new growth theory (Romer, 1990; Aghion and Howitt, 
1992) and the literature on ‘national systems of innovation’ 
(Lundvall, 1992; Nelson, 1993; Edquist, 2004). 
5. The countries included in the comparison are: Austria, Bel-
gium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Nether-
lands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the 
United Kingdom, i.e. the same as in Maddison (2003) referred 
to earlier. 
6. Rents from oil and gas production has been around 15% of 
GDP in recent years (since 2000) according to Statistics 
Norway (Cappelen and Mjøset, 2009). 
7. See Cappelen et al (2000). 
8. The index is a normalized version of the familiar ‘revealed 
comparative advantage’ measure (RCA). The RCA is defined 
as the share of a specific sector in a country’s GDP divided 
by the similar figure for the world as whole (or the area we 
are comparing with). The index, then, is (RCA–1)/(RCA+1) 
and varies between 1 (in which case the RCA measure is in-
definitely large) and –1 (RCA equal to zero). 
9. Norway’s level of domestic R&D investment has more in 
common with other natural-resource based economies such 
as Australia and Canada than with its closest European 
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neighbors. In 2004, overall R&D investment accounted for 
1.6–2.0% of GDP in these three countries, with industry ac-
counting for about one half of the domestic R&D investment. 
Source: OECD. 
10. The same methodology is used in Figure 5’s depiction of firm-
level indicators of innovative performance, based on the CIS 
data. 
11. Hence, although Norway and Sweden are sometimes catego-
rized as being similar in many respects (Katzenstein, 1985), 
the evidence in Figure 5 suggests some important differences 
in their national innovation systems. 
12. Niosi (2002) characterizes the Norwegian system as ‘diffu-
sion-oriented’. 
13. For an interesting discussion of some of these aspects in the 
case of Denmark see Lundvall (2003). 
14. The Norwegian Government has recently (after this paper 
was written) published a new white paper on innovation (St. 
meld. nr.7, 2008–2009). In the white paper the government 
expresses great satisfaction with the current policies which 
tend to favor areas of traditional strength and in the resource-
based sector. 
15. In light of this it is disquieting to observe that in contrast to 
most other European economies, the share of Norwegian 
firms reporting that they were active innovators has declined 
during the first years of the new millennium (Castellacci et al, 
2009). 
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